Upsetting the Balance:  Ignoring the Separation of Powers Doctrine in Council of New York v. Bloomberg by Benedict, Bradley A.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 4 Article 3
2007
Upsetting the Balance: Ignoring the Separation of
Powers Doctrine in Council of New York v.
Bloomberg
Bradley A. Benedict
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation






Upsetting the Balance 
IGNORING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
DOCTRINE IN COUNCIL OF NEW YORK V. 
BLOOMBERG 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A power shift occurred in New York State governments 
during the winter of 2006, albeit without much fanfare and 
without the benefit of a constitutional convention or 
amendment.  Instead, the New York Court of Appeals1 
(“Court”) issued its opinion in Council of New York v. 
Bloomberg, a case arising out of a clash between the New York 
City Council (“Council”) and Mayor Michael Bloomberg.2  The 
ruling may have resolved the conflict, but it also challenged 
pervasive notions concerning the roles of coordinate branches 
of government under the doctrine of separation of powers.   
Governmental authority in the United States, both 
nationally and locally, is carefully allocated among distinct 
departments to promote democracy and efficient governance.3  
Conflicts between branches emerge when one branch interferes 
with, circumvents, or ignores another branch’s inherent 
authority, as delineated in the pertinent jurisdiction’s 
foundational document.4  Contravention of the intended 
allocation of governmental powers undermines democratic 
principles by condoning a non-ratified reapportionment of 
  
 1  The Court of Appeals is the State’s highest court.  GERALD BENJAMIN, 
Structures of New York State Government, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
IN NEW YORK 57, 65 (1997). 
 2 846 N.E.2d 433 (2006) [hereinafter Bloomberg]. 
 3 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 4 Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has 
Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 695 (2006). 
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power.5  In order to ensure its advantages for democratic 
governance, the doctrine of separation of powers obliges each 
branch of government to operate within its delegated authority 
and in accordance with the system of checks and balances 
adopted under the applicable foundational document, whether 
it be the federal or a state constitution or a city charter.6  Each 
department owes due deference toward coordinate branches to 
the extent reflected by these organizing principles.7 
The distinct roles ascribed to individual governmental 
departments enable qualitatively different risks to the existing 
balance of power and engender unique responsibilities for the 
preservation of established delegation of authority.  For 
example, when other branches of government encroach upon 
the function of the law-making body, not only is the accepted 
structure of government subverted, but also the power of the 
people’s most directly representative body is diminished.8  (The 
rise of ever-stronger executive branches in American politics 
has recently highlighted this issue.9)  Further, special 
responsibility for the resolution of interbranch power struggles 
is conferred to the judiciary as a result of its “province and 
duty . . . to say what the law is.”10  Tension inevitably arises 
when this coequal branch wields the power of judicial review—
  
 5 See BENJAMIN, supra note 1, at 57 (“[A]rriving at an appropriate balance 
among these institutions is one of the most significant decisions that faces constitution 
makers.”). 
 6 This Note accepts this essentially formalist conception, which has been 
adopted by many scholars and judges. See Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, 
Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 13 (2003).  
It is also consistent, however, with a “functionalist” approach, at least where the 
exercise of deference contributes to more efficient interbranch relations.  See id.  
 7 BRADFORD P. WILSON, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review, in 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 63, 73-74 (1994) (“The weight of each 
of the various parts in the constitutional balance depends on what the Constitution 
delegates to it . . . .”). 
 8 See CHARLES O. JONES, SEPARATE BUT EQUAL BRANCHES: CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENCY 4 (1995) (maintaining the preeminent place of the legislative branch:  
“Congress is the centerpiece of democracy”). 
 9 The topic of presidential encroachment upon the province of Congress has 
received particularly widespread attention during the administration of George W. 
Bush.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Power of One, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at 8; 
Andrew Sullivan, We Don’t Need a New King George: How Can the President Interpret 
the Law as If It Didn’t Apply to Him? TIME, Jan. 23, 2006, at 74.  See also John Yoo, 
How the Presidency Regained Its Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2006 at D15 (offering a 
favorable view of a more robust presidency). For commentary on the evolution of 
increasingly powerful state executives, see Rogan Kersh et al., “More a Distinction of 
Words Than Things”: The Evolution of Separated Powers in the American States, 4 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 28-40 (1998).  
 10 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
2007] UPSETTING THE BALANCE 1263 
 
to be the final arbiter of statutory meaning and constitutional 
interpretation (including in cases concerning the constraints of 
separated powers).11  Thus, the judiciary bears a heightened 
responsibility to respect coordinate branches when exercising 
this ultimate power.   
The Bloomberg dispute involved a failure of both the 
Mayor and the state’s judiciary to act in accordance with the 
principles embodied by the doctrine of separation of powers.12  
The outcome of the case illustrates how such failures can result 
in a shift in the existing balance of power and a potentially less 
representative government.13  After a breakdown in the 
apparatus of applicable checks and balances, litigation between 
the Council and Mayor Bloomberg led to the decision by the 
state’s highest court expanding executive power at the expense 
of legislatures across New York State.14   
The conflict began in earnest when the Mayor refused to 
enforce a local law, enacted by an override of his veto, on the 
grounds that he believed the law was invalid.15  The measure 
would have barred the City from entering into contracts for 
goods or services unless the contractor extended the same 
benefits to its employees’ domestic partners as it offered to 
employees’ spouses.16  The Mayor initiated a legal challenge, 
arguing that the law was preempted by state law and violated 
the City Charter, and sought a temporary restraining order to 
stay its implementation.17  Despite being denied the motion, the 
Mayor declined to follow the law’s directive.18  The matter was 
ultimately resolved when the Court affirmed the dismissal of a 
mandamus proceeding initiated by the Council to enjoin the 
Mayor to enforce the law.19  The Court’s decision undercut the 
customary procedures for determining a law’s validity, 
effectively denying the Council an evidentiary hearing to 
support its case.20  The Bloomberg precedent effects a shift in 
  
 11 HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, Separation of Powers in the American Constitution, 
in SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 3, 14. 
 12  See infra Part IV. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 433. 
 15 See Sabrina Tavernise, Judge Rules Bloomberg Must Carry Out Equal 
Benefits Law He Vetoed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at B3. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Roy L. Reardon & Mary Elizabeth McGarry, Cases Decided on Clergy 
Sexual Abuse, Domestic Partner Benefits, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 2006, at 3, col. 1. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 435.  
 20 Id. at 445 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
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the balance of power in New York State and may well 
embolden state and local executives to embrace unilateral 
action when facing similar conflicts.21   
To set the stage for a discussion of how the Bloomberg 
decision undermines the principles of separation of powers, 
Part II of this Note will briefly outline the purposes and 
operation of the doctrine in American political theory, including 
special consideration of the application of the doctrine in the 
state and local contexts.  In Part III, the background, 
procedural history, and ultimate resolution of the Bloomberg 
case will be analyzed.  A critical look at the case’s likely 
detrimental impact will be discussed in Part IV.  Finally, Part 
V will present two ways in which these harmful effects might 
be avoided or mitigated.  
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS  
The American political heritage demonstrates an 
unwavering practice of organizing governments that 
implement the doctrine of separation of powers.  The benefits of 
this system, recognized by the Founding Fathers and their 
successors, go beyond the checking function most often 
associated with the doctrine.  This structure, in which distinct 
departments exercise their particular delegated powers while 
operating within the constraints of their individual authority, 
was also selected as the one most conducive to good 
governance.  The advantages that flow from this arrangement 
and the institutional safeguards that govern interbranch 
relations will be considered in this section, along with a 
comparative view of the doctrine as it operates in the state 
constitutional context.  
A. The Advantages of Separation of Powers  
The early American statesmen formed governments of 
distinct departments separated by functional roles.22  Drawing 
mainly from Montesquieu and Locke, the Framers of both the 
federal and state constitutions divided the power of their 
respective governments among the now-familiar legislative, 
  
 21 See infra Part IV.A. 
 22 Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions 
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 211 (1989). 
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executive, and judicial branches.23  The system adopted by the 
Founders expanded upon existing conceptions of mixed 
governments, which sought balance in part by 
institutionalizing existing social divisions.24  Rather than 
merely assuring that various interests received some voice in 
the government, the Framers recognized that the fundamental 
principle of popular sovereignty demanded that the new system 
vest each branch with power derived from the people as a 
whole.25  Thus, they formed a complex arrangement of 
departments organized by core roles and responsibilities, but 
one that represented a “balance of constitutional orders or 
powers, blended with a constitutional differentiation of 
functions.”26   
The Founders advanced two main categories of 
advantages of the divided government structure they proposed, 
one predominantly cautionary and one more effectual.27  First, 
by dividing government operations into separate functional 
departments, proponents argued that consolidation of power 
would be institutionally deterred.28  Second, enhanced 
efficiencies and more varied constituency representation would 
be achieved through functional specialization and 
compartmentalized institutional roles.29  
1. The Diffusion of Power 
Primarily, the separation of powers doctrine is an 
instrument to diffuse power throughout the government.30  
Preventing the accumulation of authority within any individual 
or body lessens the opportunity for abuse of power and political 
oppression.31  This benefit follows both as a matter of structure 
as well as in the operation of departments carrying out 
  
 23 See MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 5-10. 
 24 WILSON, supra note 7, at 72-73. 
 25 Casper, supra note 22, at 216. 
 26 WILSON, supra note 7, at 73 (quoting HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE 
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 62 (1981)).  
 27 MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 10. These categorical distinctions have been 
described as “negative” and “positive” functions of the doctrine. Peabody & Nugent, 
supra note 6, at 22. 
 28 See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 29  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 30 MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 3. 
 31 JAMES W. CEASER, Doctrines of Presidential-Congressional Relations, in 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 7, at 89, 93. 
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logically interrelated roles.32  In a nation of laws where 
different bodies are responsible for law making, law 
enforcement, and adjudication, the people have recourse 
against a rogue branch of government that attempts to exert its 
power improperly, through the checking functions of the other 
branches.33  Thus, for example, legislatures have the primary 
power to enact laws, but it is the executive who has the 
responsibility of enforcement, and only the judiciary may apply 
the laws in specific cases and controversies.34  In addition to the 
inherent safeguard of this general division of labor, overreach 
from one office would be countered by the natural jealousies of 
coordinate branches.35  As James Madison succinctly put it in 
one of the numerous Federalist Papers addressing the 
separation of powers, “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition.”36  It is this acknowledged tendency to resist the 
efforts of counteracting branches’ attempts to test the 
boundaries of granted power that provides an inherent 
checking function in a divided system.37  
2. Promoting the Effectiveness of Government 
The second group of benefits that results from 
separation of powers derives from the efficiency advantages 
gained by allocating specific powers to departments uniquely 
suited to them.38  Among these advantages are the wider array 
of personalities who may be gainfully exploited in successful 
governance,39 the ability of diverse departments to represent a 
wider array of interests,40 and the positive effects of multiple 
constituency representation.41  When each branch is tailored to 
its role within the overall scheme, the result is a whole that can 
  
 32 Id. at 92-93. 
 33 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324-27 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961) (describing Montesquieu’s warning that there can be no liberty when 
the same body may exercise the distinct powers of the executive, legislator, and judge). 
 34 Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of 
Public Confidence and Constitutional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 18 (1987). 
 35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 347-48 
(“[Branches would be restrained] by so contriving the interior structure of the 
government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places.”). 
 36 Id. at 349. 
 37  MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 11. 
 38 TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 19-26 (2004). 
 39 CEASER, supra note 31, at 93-94. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 22-23. 
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be, at once, stable, cautious, and wise while also energetic, 
responsive, and adaptive.42  As Bruce G. Peabody and John D. 
Nugent wrote in their recent article, “[S]eparation of powers 
ties different functions and traits essential for governance and 
different kinds of power to distinct institutions in order to 
promote accountability, effective policymaking and 
administration, and political legitimacy, among other goals.”43 
B. The Role of Checks and Balances and the Interplay of 
Government Branches 
A divided government’s organizational structure does 
more than allocate broad functional roles to various 
departments; it also establishes the mechanisms that delineate 
how and to what extent the branches interact in the day-to-day 
operations of government.44  Despite some of the overheated 
rhetoric from some of the Founding Fathers,45 a rigid 
compartmentalization into legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions was never anticipated.46  Rather, interplay among 
branches was expected and encouraged, to the end of achieving 
the most responsible and representative exercise of power.47  
These interactions are largely taken into account within the 
framework of the Constitution.48  They are managed through 
carefully selected forms of checks and balances, such as the 
  
 42 MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 12-13. 
 43 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 34. 
 44 MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 11. 
 45 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 324 
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”), NO. 48, at 333 
(James Madison) (“The legislative department is every where extending the sphere of 
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); John Adams, Letter to 
Jefferson (Mar. 1, 1789), 14 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 599 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 
1955), quoted in Leslie Southwick, Separation of Powers at the State Level: 
Interpretations and Challenges, 72 MISS. L.J. 927, 942 (2003) (“That greatest and most 
necessary of all Amendments, the Separation of the Executive Power, from the 
Legislative, . . . [w]ithout this our Government is in danger of being a continual 
struggle between a Junto of Grandees, for the first Chair.”). 
 46 CEASER, supra note 31, at 94-95.  
 47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 33, at 332 (“I shall 
undertake in the next place, to shew that unless these departments be so far connected 
and blended as to give to each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of 
separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in 
practice be duly maintained.”). 
 48 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 26. 
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President’s veto power, the Senate’s confirmation power, and 
the House’s impeachment power in the federal Constitution.49   
These checks and balances work at the frontiers of each 
branch’s authority and define the manner in which each branch 
may assert itself into the workings of the others, as 
contemplated by the founding document.50  Some commentators 
perceive this interaction as a limited sharing of allocated 
powers that improves decision-making, albeit at some cost to 
efficiency.51  Even those who adhere to the idea that robust 
interplay has a largely positive effect on governance concede 
that the systemic checks help define undue encroachment so 
that the branches can legitimately defend themselves.52  
Ultimately, then, checks and balances provide specific 
parameters of the constitutional constraints on power of any 
one department operating in the traditional area of another.53  
C. Separation of Powers in State Constitutions 
State constitutions also embody the separation of 
powers doctrine via their establishment of divided 
governments.  It has been noted, however, that an analysis 
tailored to the state’s individual context is appropriate.54  This 
is partly because the details of power allocation within state 
governments differ from those of the federal government, but a 
distinctive analysis also may be necessary due to the historical 
context of a state constitution’s origin and evolution.55   
While states are under no obligation under the federal 
Constitution to observe any particular formulation of separated 
powers,56 all fifty state constitutions reflect the same basic 
tripartite structure as the federal model.57  And many explicitly 
  
 49 Id.  
 50 See CEASER, supra note 31, at 94-97. 
 51 Id. at 95-96. 
 52 See MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 13. 
 53 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 26. 
 54 See generally Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of 
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999); 
G. Alan Tarr, Symposium Article, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State 
Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329 (2003). 
 55 Tarr, supra note 54, at 340. 
 56 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he 
distribution of powers among the branches of a State’s government raises no questions 
of federal constitutional law . . . .”). 
 57 RICHARD BRIFFAULT, Principal Provisions of State Constitutions: A Brief 
Overview, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 
21, 21. 
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provide for a strictly distinct allocation of powers among three 
branches.58  For example, Kentucky’s first constitution 
provided: 
§ 1. The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, each of them to be confided to a separate body of 
magistracy, to wit: those which are legislative to one, those which 
are executive to another, and those which are judiciary to another.   
§ 2. No person, or collection of persons, being of one of these 
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of 
the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.59  
Other states’ constitutions, like the federal Constitution, 
simply imply separation principles through organizational 
structure.60  This fundamental difference could inform a court’s 
evaluation of the propriety of certain government interactions.61  
An incursion by one branch into the arena of another in a state 
governed by a provision like that in Kentucky’s constitution 
might be subject to more stringent scrutiny than one occurring 
in a state where the separation of powers doctrine is merely 
implied.62  
States have also adopted their own systems for 
allocating and constraining power, and shaped their own 
approaches for governing the interplay of government 
branches.  Such controls may include idiosyncratic limitations 
on legislative authority, organizational complexities, and 
uncommon checks and balances compared to those at the 
federal level.63  For example, many states divide executive 
duties into separate offices, such as that of a state attorney 
general, secretary of state, and treasurer.64  Line item65 and 
  
 58 Some forty state constitutions currently include explicit separation 
language.  Tarr, supra note 54, at 337. 
 59 KY. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2 (1792).  The text remains largely unchanged 
today.  KY. CONST. §§ 27, 28 (1891).  It has been suggested that this language came 
from Thomas Jefferson, who drafted a 1783 proposed constitution for Virginia that is 
nearly identical.  See Southwick, supra note 45, at 940-44.  
 60 See supra note 58. 
 61 Id. at 338. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 337-38. 
 64 Id. at 338. 
 65 Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 
1171 (1993). 
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legislative vetoes66 are examples of measures that regulate 
interbranch relations which are, for now, unique to states.67 
Beyond such textual interpretation, there is perhaps a 
more fundamental distinction to be drawn between the state 
and federal perspective arising from the principles of 
sovereignty and federalism.68  This difference follows from the 
fact that all federal authority came at the acquiescence of the 
sovereign states.69  Thus, the federal Constitution confers 
powers to the federal government, whereas states’ constitutions 
marshal plenary power, and are therefore fundamentally 
documents of limitation.70  Consequently, restrictions upon 
state legislatures are commonly found in state constitutions 
that would be unnecessary to keep Congress’ limited powers in 
check.71  In this manner, for example, a state may rely less on 
interbranch checks than on more direct constraints of 
legislative authority.72  
Another factor to bear in mind when analyzing state 
government organization is the change in prevailing attitudes 
toward state governments.  Although the Antifederalists, for 
example, were profoundly concerned by an encroachment on 
state sovereignty,73 local legislatures were not considered to 
present a similar threat to liberty.74  Direct representation by a 
“legislative assembly composed of one’s friends and neighbors, 
which met briefly and was subject to annual popular election” 
did not warrant the same degree of vigilance or institutional 
safeguards.75  Thus, state constitutions in the 18th and early 
19th centuries rarely exhibited the “delicate balance” 
  
 66 Tarr, supra note 54, at 337. 
 67 Both of these mechanisms have proven problematic at the federal level: a 
presidential line item veto and a congressional legislative veto were struck down in 
Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 420-21 (1998), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
959 (1983), respectively, as violating the separation of powers under the federal 
constitution. 
 68 See Tarr, supra note 54, at 329. 
 69 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 5 (1998). 
 70 Tarr, supra note 54, at 329-30.  
 71 Id.; see also RICHARD BRIFFAULT, State Constitutions in the Federal 
System, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 3, 
9-19. 
 72 Tarr, supra note 54, at 329-30. 
 73 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James 
Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State 
Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1276 (1989). 
 74 Tarr, supra note 54, at 334. 
 75 Id. 
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enshrined in the federal Constitution.76  Rather, strong 
legislatures and comparatively weak, often appointed, 
executives were the norm.77  Whereas it has come to be 
accepted in the federal context that “none of the several 
departments is subordinate, but that all are coordinate, 
independent, and coequal,”78 this was rarely the situation 
established by early state constitutions.  
Over time, however, state constitutional reform brought 
forth a more equitable distribution of power among 
governmental departments.79  Populist reforms of the 19th 
century80 and the rise of stronger executives in the early 20th 
century resulted in considerably more balanced state 
governments.81  Many of the measures that advanced this more 
balanced organization were adopted for essentially the same 
purpose as the checks and balances incorporated in the federal 
Constitution—to constrain abuses of power by single factions 
within the government.82  This state constitutional evolution 
toward government in counterpoise may be viewed as a further 
tacit endorsement of the separation doctrine.83  
However similar to the federal system a state’s 
government may appear, when analyzing a case implicating 
the separation of powers doctrine, the state’s constitutional 
history and the development of its political institutions are 
paramount to the analysis.84  
D. The Separation of Powers Context of Council of New 
York v. Bloomberg 
The events surrounding the New York Court of Appeals 
decision that is the subject of this Note involve both state and 
  
 76 For example, the governor under New York’s first constitution has been 
described as “a mere ‘sentinel’ who had virtually no relationship to the actual daily 
business of governing New York.”  John T. Buckley, The Governor—From Figurehead 
to Prime Minister: A Historical Study of the New York State Constitution and the Shift 
of Basic Power to the Chief Executive, 68 ALB. L. REV. 865, 869 (2005). 
 77 Tarr, supra note 54, at 334. 
 78 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 246 (1998). 
 79 Tarr, supra note 54, at 334-35. 
 80 For example, in a number of states reformists provided for direct election 
of previously appointed officials, such as governors, and imposed a plethora of 
restrictions on legislatures.  See id. 
 81 See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 76, at 868-76. 
 82 These included direct election of executive offices and judicial seats, as well 
as restrictions on legislative action on certain subjects.  Tarr, supra note 54, at 334-35.  
 83 BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 57. 
 84 Rossi, supra note 54, at 1240. 
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local governmental organization, as established by the 
Constitution of the State of New York and the New York City 
Charter.  Although this conflict primarily concerned a 
municipal governmental dispute, the separation of powers 
principles at issue implicate both state and city foundational 
documents.  This follows both because the City is organized 
under powers granted by the state constitution85 and because 
the state constitution establishes a unified system for all courts 
in the state.86  There is no judicial branch represented in the 
New York City Charter.87  Thus, state courts adjudicated the 
matter, and the Court of Appeals’ holding is binding across the 
state.  This section will first discuss separation of powers as 
reflected in New York State history and law, and then will 
outline the governmental organizational framework pertinent 
to Bloomberg. 
1. Separation of Powers and the New York State 
Constitution 
The Constitution of New York State reflects a number of 
the concepts discussed in the previous section.  For example, it 
implicitly separates governmental power into three main 
branches, but uses no explicit language in establishing the 
division,88 and it features a somewhat dispersed executive 
branch in that the governor, attorney general, and comptroller 
are independently elected officials.89  Despite these checks, over 
the history of the state, the governor’s office has evolved into a 
quite powerful post through constitutional change.90  One of the 
most significant redistributions of power in the state came 
when New York amended its constitution to grant the governor 
a preeminent role in setting the state’s budget.91   
Legal challenges involving the budgetary process 
illustrate the New York Court of Appeals’ view on the operation 
  
 85 See infra Part II.D.2. 
 86 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 1(a) (McKinney 2006). 
 87 See LaGuardia v. Smith, 41 N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1942).  See generally 
N.Y. CITY CHARTER (2004). 
 88 BENJAMIN, supra note 5, at 57-58. 
 89 ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, New York’s State Constitution in Comparative 
Context, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 29, 
36-37.  Also notable is the role of the lieutenant governor, who is elected with the 
governor but presides over the state senate with a casting vote.  BENJAMIN, supra note 
5, at 58, 64. 
 90 See generally Buckley, supra note 76. 
 91 Id. at 884-85. 
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of separation of powers issues in New York State.92  The Court’s 
opinions evidence the kind of tailored analysis appropriate in 
the state context.93  The amendment, enacted in 1928, gave 
New York’s executive the exclusive power to draft budget 
legislation.94  The legislature was thereafter restricted to four 
responses to a governor’s proposed budget:  to “(1) approve the 
comprehensive budget . . .; (2) eliminate or (3) reduce proposed 
appropriations; or (4) add appropriations, but only if done 
separately and distinctly, and only if referring to a single object 
or purpose.”95  Because the budgeting function is so 
fundamentally intertwined with policymaking, legislative-
executive clashes over the new process began making their way 
up to the Court of Appeals almost immediately, and they 
continue to do so.96  
In adjudicating the early budget cases, the Court 
unsurprisingly ratified the idea that a constitutional 
reallocation of power was permissible and binding on the 
governmental departments.97  A recent contribution to the 
Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence comes from Silver v. 
Pataki.98  In that case, the legislature attempted to pass 
legislation outside the budget process to circumvent the 
governor’s power to exercise line-item vetoes of appropriations 
within the budget.99  In one measure for example, the 
lawmakers conditioned the release of appropriated funds to 
build a prison on the inclusion of on-site facilities for inmate 
educational and other services.100  The Court invalidated the 
legislative acts because they infringed on the governor’s 
constitutional power to have his budget provisions accepted or 
rejected but not altered.101  The Court, however, acknowledged 
that the extent to which policymaking power accompanied the 
transfer of budgeting authority was a closer question, and 
opined that certain nonfiscal items would be inappropriate 
  
 92 Buckley, supra note 76, at 886. 
 93  See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 94 Buckley, supra note 76, at 883. 
 95 Id. at 885 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4). 
 96 See, e.g., People v. Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1929); Pataki v. N.Y. 
State Assembly, 824 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 2004).  
 97 Id. at 889 (citing Tremaine, 168 N.E. at 825). 
 98 Pataki v. N.Y. State Assembly (consolidating Silver v. Pataki), 824 N.E.2d 
898, 902-03 (N.Y. 2004). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 904-05.  
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subjects of a governor’s budget appropriation.102  Thus, despite 
its obligation to uphold the executive budgeting amendment, 
the Court recognized the tension operating against an 
interpretation of separated powers that ceded a natural role of 
the legislative body to another department.103  The Court also 
declared its continuing reluctance to draw a bright line 
delineating gubernatorial and legislative powers.104  Silver v. 
Pataki exemplifies the kind of customized separation of powers 
analysis that must be employed at the state level.105  The case 
continues the Court’s acknowledgment of the relevance of the 
separation of powers doctrine, as embodied by the state 
constitution, to the analysis of interdepartmental conflicts.106 
2. The New York State Constitution’s Home Rule 
Article and the New York City Charter 
The doctrine of separation of powers is also applied in 
some local governments.  Although many towns, villages, and 
small cities are organized around largely administrative 
bodies, others reflect the structure of larger governmental 
entities.107  The New York City Charter, adopted pursuant to 
the state constitution’s provision for “home rule,” governs local 
government organization and administration.108  The Charter 
  
 102 Id. at 909.  The Court hypothesized, for example, that a governor may not 
impose a retirement age on firefighters by making appropriations to fire departments 
conditioned on acceptance of the rule or otherwise subvert state statutes in an 
appropriations bill.  Id. at 907. 
 103  See Buckley, supra note 76, at 902-04 (contrasting the widely differing 
positions taken by the plurality, concurrence, and dissent on demarcating the 
governor’s power of appropriation). 
 104 Pataki, 824 N.E.2d at 910.  
 105 For a contemporaneous account of the impact of this litigation on New 
York State separation of powers doctrine, see generally The Committee on State 
Affairs, The New York State Budget Process and the Constitution: Defining and 
Protecting the “Delicate Balance Of Power,” 58 THE RECORD OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR 
OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 345 (2003). 
 106  For New York State Court of Appeals decisions rooted in the separation of 
powers, see, for example, Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 
N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (N.Y. 2003); Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995); 
Clark v. Cuomo, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1985). 
 107 Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the 
Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2544-45 (2006); 
EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN & MAXWELL LEHMAN, RESTRUCTURING THE GOVERNMENT OF 
NEW YORK CITY 56-57 (1972). 
 108 ADRIENNE KIVELSON, WHAT MAKES NEW YORK CITY RUN? 19 (The League 
of Women Voters of the City of N.Y. Educ. Fund 3d ed. 2001). 
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distributes power between two distinct departments, which 
have been granted limited authority.109 
Article 9 of the New York State Constitution (“Home 
Rule”) sets forth the state legislature’s power to create local 
governments, with the stated purpose of establishing 
democratic, self-governing bodies that are responsive to local 
matters.110  The Home Rule article largely cedes control of 
regional matters to the localities.111  By this provision, the New 
York State Constitution grants specific powers to localities, 
allows the state legislature to grant additional ones, and 
constrains State interference with certain local issues.112  
Specifically, the Home Rule article confers self-government 
upon the people of a local jurisdiction through a representative 
legislative body.113  But provision for the formation of local 
governments is only vaguely stated:  “[t]he legislature shall 
provide for the creation and organization of local governments 
in such manner as shall secure to them the rights, powers, 
privileges, and immunities granted to them by this 
constitution.”114  Thus, localities have considerable flexibility in 
certain areas, including the organization of local government.115   
Pursuant to the authority granted by the Home Rule 
article, the Charter of the City of New York establishes two 
branches of government and assigns them particular 
functions.116  The mayor is the “chief executive officer of the 
city.”117  The City Council is “vested with the legislative power 
of the city.”118  This legislative role is underscored by the 
succeeding sentence: “Any enumeration of powers in this 
charter shall not be held to limit the legislative power of the 
council, except as specifically provided in this charter.”119  In 
fact, the Charter provides explicit protection of allocated 
  
 109 N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 3, 21. 
 110 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. §§ 1-3; see RICHARD BRIFFAULT, Intergovernmental Relations, in 
DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 155, 156.  
 113 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). 
 114 Id. § 2(a).  
 115 BRIFFAULT, supra note 112, at 156-57. 
 116 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2(c)(1); N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 3, 21.  
 117 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 3. 
 118 Id. § 21. 
 119 Id. 
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authority by requiring any law that diminishes the powers 
vested in a city official to be ratified by the voters.120  
There is ample justification to apply the separation of 
powers doctrine under the New York City Charter.  The clear 
expression of representative self-determination in the Home 
Rule article along with the explicit allocation of powers and the 
protections accorded the two branches in the Charter strongly 
suggest the relevance of the doctrine.  The courts of New York 
State have almost universally subscribed to this view, and have 
assumed that separation principles apply to municipal 
organizations when adjudicating related matters.121  
III. COUNCIL OF NEW YORK V. BLOOMBERG 
The circumstances surrounding Bloomberg are notable 
for the example of unilateral executive action, but this case will 
also be remembered for the presumptuousness of the judicial 
response and the disruption in the operation of separation of 
powers doctrine in New York State the Court sanctioned.122 
Indeed, the very fact that the judiciary upended traditional 
procedures for adjudicating the validity of a local law to resolve 
this interbranch conflict may be seen as an affront to the 
democratic principles inherent to the workings of divided 
government.123 
  
 120 A local law must be submitted for referendum if it “[a]bolishes, transfers or 
curtails any power of an elective officer.”  Id. § 38(5); see also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE 
LAW § 23(2)(f) (McKinney 1994) (same). 
 121 Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 789 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (Sup. Ct. 2004); 
Under 21 Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of N.Y., 482 N.E.2d 1, 
4-5 (N.Y. 1985).  But see LaGuardia v. Smith, 41 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1942); Jennings v. 
N.Y. City Council, 814 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Table), No. 111597/05, 2006 WL 140399 (Sup. Ct. 
2006).  The LaGuardia and Jennings courts rejected the doctrine’s applicability in the 
case of a municipality because a city within New York State is not a sovereign entity, 
but rather operates solely on authority granted by the State.  LaGuardia, 41 N.E.2d at 
155-56; Jennings, 2006 WL 140399, at *3-4.  Neither court explains precisely why the 
City’s lack of sovereignty is fatal to establishing a subordinate government of separated 
powers.  Indeed, as discussed in Part II.C, it was the sovereign states that granted the 
powers allocated in the U.S. Constitution (in which the separation of powers doctrine, 
of course, is firmly rooted).  See also Recent Decisions, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1217-21 
(1942) (suggesting, in the wake of LaGuardia, that even if the doctrine does not apply 
to cities, the form of New York City’s government under its charter implies a vigorous 
independence of its two branches). 
 122 See Brief for the Brennan Ctr. for Just. at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 
433 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2005 WL 3818168 [hereinafter Brennan Ctr. Brief]. 
 123 See infra Part IV.A. 
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A. The Ill-Fated Equal Benefits Law 
On May 5, 2004, the New York City Council passed The 
Equal Benefits Law (“EBL”), which prohibited the City from 
entering into certain contracts with companies that fail to 
provide employees’ domestic partners the same benefits 
received by employees’ spouses.124  Similar measures had been 
adopted in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.125  Mayor 
Bloomberg, while generally supportive of expanding rights 
afforded to domestic partners, vetoed the measure.126  He was 
concerned about the negative effect of the law on the City’s 
finances, and stated that he did not want “to use the city’s 
buying power to legislate social issues.”127  The Council overrode 
the veto by a vote of forty-one to four.128  Claiming the 
ordinance was preempted by local, state, and federal laws, the 
Mayor instigated a declaratory judgment action to have the law 
invalidated.129  Additionally, to avoid “confusion and 
uncertainty on the part of contractors who would be unsure as 
to the validity of the law or the rules under which the City’s 
procurement system was operating,” the Mayor moved for a 
temporary restraining order to stay implementation of the law 
until a decision was made.130 
Up to this point in the developing quarrel, the checks 
and balances incorporated in the Charter operated along 
familiar lines.  Despite a shared belief in a laudable end, the 
two branches of city government disagreed on the propriety of 
this particular means.131  The Mayor declined to sign the law he 
opposed, and exercised his veto pursuant to the City Charter.132  
The Council duly overrode his veto, thereby automatically 
  
 124 See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 27 (2004), available at 
http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/bills/law04027.pdf; NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY ADMIN. 
CODE § 6-126 (2005) (New York Legislative Serv. 2005), invalidated by Council of N.Y. 
v. Bloomberg, 791 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433.  
The ordinance affected any contractor who entered into agreements with the City 
amounting to over $100,000 over a year period.  Id. 
 125 Epstein Becker & Greene, P.C., & Robyn Rudeman, Domestic-Partner 
Benefits: The Trend Continues, N.Y. EMP. LAW LETTER, Aug. 2004. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Sabrina Tavernise, Council Will Seek to Reinstate Law Giving Partners 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at B4. 
 128 Local Law No. 27. 
 129 See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436. 
 130 Brief of Respondent at 9, Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433 
(N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2006 WL 499294. 
 131 Id. at 7. 
 132 See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 37. 
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enacting the law.133   Next, the Mayor pursued his unquestioned 
right to contest the law’s validity through an established legal 
vehicle:  an action for declaratory judgment.134  Both parties’ 
actions fell within the conception of New York State’s 
separation of powers framework; the same cannot be said, 
however, for what came after. 
B. The Article 78 Proceeding and Appeals 
Although the New York Supreme Court135 refused the 
Mayor’s request to stay implementation of the EBL, the Mayor 
nevertheless refused to enforce the law, unilaterally 
proclaiming it to be invalid.136  The Mayor declared instead his 
intent to comply with the laws he felt preempted the EBL.137  In 
response, the Council filed an Article 78 proceeding in the 
nature of mandamus to compel138 on October 26, 2004, the day 
the EBL was to take effect.139 
On November 8, 2004, the New York Supreme Court 
granted the Council’s request based on the presumption of 
validity accorded to legislative enactments,140 and ordered the 
Mayor to enforce the law,141 but the Mayor still refused to 
comply and filed an appeal.142  Four months later, the Appellate 
  
 133 Id. (“If after such reconsideration the votes of two-thirds of all the council 
members be cast in favor of repassing such local law, it shall be deemed adopted, 
notwithstanding the objections of the mayor.”). 
 134  Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3. 
 135 In New York State, the Supreme Court is the trial court.  FREDERICK 
MILLER, New York State’s Judicial Article: A Work in Progress, in DECISION 1997: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 127-28. 
 136 Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) governs 
the special proceedings that are used to bring any action formerly brought under the 
writs of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari.  Alexander, Practice Commentaries, 
McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C7801:1, at 25 (1994).  When a body or 
officer fails “to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law . . . an Article 78 proceeding in 
the nature of mandamus is generally the appropriate remedy, provided that the relief 
is sought to compel the performance of an official duty that is clearly imposed or 
mandated by statute . . . .”  6 N.Y. JUR. 2D Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 47 
(1997).  The petitioner must demonstrate a “clear legal right” to the relief sought.  Id. 
§ 72. 
 139 New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 27 (2004). 
 140  See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436. 
 141 Tavernise, supra note 15, at B3.  The judgment was entered December 1, 
2004.  See Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 791 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (App. Div. 2005). 
 142 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 14, Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 
N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2005 WL 3818161 [hereinafter Council’s 
Brief]. 
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Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment and dismissed 
the proceeding, finding that the lower court had erred by not 
addressing the issue of the validity of the EBL raised by the 
Mayor.143  While admitting that “[a]n article 78 proceeding is 
not the remedy for adjudicating the validity of legislative 
enactments,” the Appellate Division held that the law’s validity 
should have been addressed.144  The court also stated that not 
considering the merits of the case would defeat “a principal 
purpose of bringing the writ of mandamus, i.e., obtaining a 
prompt, due resolution of the controversy.”145  In the decision’s 
succeeding two short paragraphs, the court found that the EBL 
was preempted by a state law that provides that government 
contracts must be granted to the lowest responsible bidder and 
by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”).146 
The Council appealed this ruling, arguing both that the 
Appellate Division erred in addressing the validity of the law, 
and also that the EBL was not preempted by either statute.147  
On February 14, 2006, the New York State Court of Appeals, in 
a four-to-three split decision, affirmed the dismissal, effectively 
invalidating the law on the same grounds as the court below.148   
C. Discussion and Analysis of the Court of Appeals’ 
Decision 
The Court divided on the issue of whether the validity of 
the law was appropriately raised as a defense to the Article 78 
proceeding.149  It had been consistently held by the Court that 
an Article 78 proceeding is not an appropriate vehicle to 
  
 143 Council of N.Y., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 109. 
 144 Id. at 109 (quoting Giuliani v. Council of N.Y., 181 Misc. 2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1999)).  The rule limiting the scope of Article 78 proceedings is well-settled law 
outside certain exceptions, such as challenges of quasi-legislative acts by governmental 
agencies, see N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp. v. McBarnette, 639 N.E.2d. 740 (N.Y. 
1994), and challenges based on as-applied unconstitutionality, see Kovarsky v. Hous. & 
Dev. Admin. of the City of N.Y., 286 N.E.2d 882 (N.Y. 1972).  See also infra note 150. 
 145 Council of N.Y., 791 N.Y.S.2d at 109. 
 146 Id. at 109-10.  The primary state statute considered was section 103(1) of 
the New York General Municipal Law (the “competitive bidding statute”), and the 
court specified section 1144(a) and (c)(2) of ERISA as preempting the EBL.  Id. at 110. 
 147 A discussion of the Majority’s preemption analysis is postponed until Part 
III.C.2, following a critique of the controversial procedural issue in Part III.C.1. 
 148 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 435. 
 149 Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3. 
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challenge the validity of a law.150  However, the Bloomberg 
Majority distinguished previous cases where it was the 
petitioner who challenged a law’s validity; here, the respondent 
raised the issue as a defense.151  The Court reasoned that 
because a writ of mandamus should never be granted to force 
the government to perform an illegal act, a court could rule on 
a law’s validity when raised in this context.152  The Majority 
then proceeded to affirm the Appellate Division’s holding that 
state and federal statutes preempted the EBL.153 
The dissenting judges found the ruling to be an 
unacceptable encroachment upon legislative authority.154  
Rejecting the idea that, even when denied a restraining order, 
the Mayor could choose to ignore legislative enactments upon 
his own determination that a law is invalid, they maintained, 
commensurate with the general rule, that an Article 78 
proceeding was an inadequate vehicle for a decision on the 
law’s validity.155  Establishing this new precedent, they 
concluded, represented a clear violation of separation of 
powers.156  It “skews the roles of the legislative and executive 
branches” by allowing the Mayor to “infringe upon the 
legislative powers reserved to the City Council” and “to 
determine, in the first instance, whether a law is valid, and 
thereby clothe the executive with not only legislative but 
judicial powers.”157  As reported in the New York Law Journal, 
  
 150 As the Bloomberg Dissent noted, “[A] petitioner who challenges the validity 
of legislation may not proceed by article 78 but must bring a declaratory judgment 
action . . . .  That is the law.  Cases to this effect are legion.”  Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 
443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).  See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Albany, 512 
N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1987); Bd. of Educ. v. Gootnick, 404 N.E.2d 1318, 1319 (N.Y. 
1980); Press v. County of Monroe, 409 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1980); Solnick v. Whalen, 
401 N.E.2d 190, 195 (N.Y. 1980); Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water 
Auth., 248 N.E.2d 855, 857 (N.Y. 1969). 
 151 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436-37.  The Majority cited two cases allegedly 
supporting this proposition, one from 1936 and the other from 1900.  Id.; see Carow v. 
Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 6 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1936); People ex rel. Balcom v. 
Mosher, 57 N.E. 88 (N.Y. 1900).  The Dissent noted that no language in either opinion 
constituted such a holding of the Court.  Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 444 n.6 (Rosenblatt, 
J., dissenting).  Further, the cited cases predate the consolidation of writ practice 
under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 and the subsequent case law on Article 78 proceedings.  See 
infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text. 
 152 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436-37. 
 153 Id. at 435; see discussion infra Part III.C.2.  
 154 Id. at 442-44 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 444. 
 156 Id. at 446. 
 157 Id. at 444. 
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“[t]o the dissent, the question was not merely one of procedure, 
but of constitutional dimension.”158 
1. The Procedural Issue 
The Dissent did not reach the preemption issue, but 
rather recommended the resumption of the previously initiated 
action for declaratory judgment.159  This was not a mere 
procedural formality; it was an explicit recognition of the 
inadequacy of an Article 78 special proceeding to resolve 
challenges to the validity of legislative enactments.160  The 
history and purpose of Article 78 proceedings supports this 
position. 
New York codified the common law writ practice in 
1921, and consolidated the procedure for these orders under 
Article 78 of the former Civil Practice Act in 1937.161  Pursuant 
to this Act (and its successor, Article 78 of the CPLR), petitions 
for the major common law writs must be brought in a special 
proceeding as defined by the Article.162  The purpose of 
establishing a unified procedure was to provide a simplified 
and expeditious method by which a petitioner could assert a 
right to relief.163  Because most of these matters involve 
relatively straightforward assertions of a legal right,164 Article 
78 cases are heard as “special proceedings.”165  Generally, a 
special proceeding entails limited opportunity for discovery166 
and presentation of evidence167 compared with an action.  In a 
simple Article 78 proceeding, the court, having received the 
  
 158 Reardon & McGarry, supra note 17, at 3. 
 159 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 447 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
 160 Id. at 446 (“This distinction between Article 78 and declaratory judgment 
is critical and must be maintained if we are to preserve proper methods of 
constitutional analysis.  This goes to more than form. In the case before us, it 
implicates separation of powers.”). 
 161 6 N.Y. JUR .2D, Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 1 (1997). 
 162 Id.  The Article comprises petitions for the writs of mandamus, certiorari to 
review, and prohibition.  Id. 
 163 Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 
7B, CPLR C7801:1, at 25 (1994). 
 164  DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 904 (3d ed. 1999). 
 165 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(a) (McKinney 1994).  For general rules governing 
special proceedings, see id., art. 4. 
 166  Id. § 408 (McKinney 2001) (requiring leave of court for disclosure in most 
circumstances); SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 914,  
 167 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(d); SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 940 (“Most Article 78 
proceedings are resolved on papers alone,” but if there is a triable issue of fact, then a 
trial should be held.). 
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parties’ papers, disposes of the case as it would a motion for 
summary judgment.168  However, the CPLR accommodates 
cases that require a more fully developed record.169  For 
example, a court must determine if there is a triable issue of 
fact warranting an evidentiary hearing.170  In fact, a full 
panoply of options is available to a court hearing an Article 78 
matter—including conversion to an action for declaratory 
judgment.171 
This kind of simplified procedure, involving only a 
handful of petitions, affidavits, and pleadings is ill suited to the 
practice of judicial review.  Yet the Appellate Division relied on 
nothing more when it declared the EBL invalid.172  A limited 
proceeding without an evidentiary hearing is inconsistent with 
the standard of review employed to challenge legislative acts.173  
Statutes are accorded presumptive validity in New York 
State.174  In order to prevail on a claim that a law is facially 
invalid, a challenger must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt” 
that in “‘any degree and in every conceivable application’ the 
law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment.”175  A factual 
record developed from a full hearing should thus be seen as the 
bare minimum of due process when New York courts undertake 
the act of judicial review.  As the Bloomberg Dissent noted, 
application of this stringent burden is substantially 
undermined—and the presumptive validity of legislative acts 
compromised—when a court decides the issue summarily and 
without the benefit of a record.176  “This distinction between 
article 78 and declaratory judgment is critical . . . .”177  Had the 
  
 168  Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 
7B, CPLR C7804:9, at 664 (1994); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 409(b) (McKinney 2001). 
 169  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(d). 
 170  Id. § 7804(h) (“If a triable issue of fact is raised in a proceeding under this 
article, it shall be tried forthwith.”).  “The ‘forthwith’ directive is consistent with the 
summary nature and purpose of Article 78 proceedings and, in effect, creates a trial 
preference.”  Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 
7B, CPLR C7804:9, at 664 (1994). 
 171 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 103(c) (McKinney 2003). 
 172  Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 445 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
 173  Id. at 446. 
 174 20 N.Y. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 60 (2005).  Municipal ordinances are 
granted the same deference.  Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 359 N.E.2d 337 
(N.Y. 1976). 
 175 See, e.g., Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 787 N.E.2d 624, 627 (N.Y. 2003) 
(citations omitted); Cohen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 850, 852 (N.Y. 1999) (quoting McGowan 
v. Burstein, 525 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1998)). 
 176 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 446 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).  
 177  Id. 
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matter been litigated under the Mayor’s original declaratory 
judgment action, the Council would almost certainly have had 
the opportunity for a full hearing to proffer evidence in support 
of its case.178  The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals 
failed to require the development of a record, which would be 
essential to properly adjudicating the legality of the EBL under 
a standard of presumptive validity. 
2. The Preemption Issue 
The Majority confidently asserted that no record was 
necessary because the matter turned “entirely on issues of law, 
not of fact.”179  However, it then proceeded to make factual 
assumptions and narrow constructions of law in its analysis of 
the preemption issue with regard to New York’s competitive 
bidding statute and federal ERISA legislation.180   
a. The Competitive Bidding Statute 
The competitive bidding statute was enacted by New 
York State to impose fiscal discipline on public expenditures 
and to prevent “favoritism, improvidence, fraud and corruption 
in the awarding of public contracts.”181  It provides that all 
public works contracts over a certain cost threshold “shall be 
awarded . . . to the lowest-responsible bidder . . . except as 
otherwise expressly provided by an act of the legislature”182   
To rebut the statute’s alleged preemption of the EBL, 
the Council first relied on a legislative provision that it argued 
fell within the exception clause.183  This enactment—an 
implementing statute of a constitutional Home Rule 
provision—allows localities to regulate the “wages or salaries, 
the hours of work or labor, and the protection, welfare and 
  
 178 The merits of the preemption arguments inveighed against the EBL turn 
on controverted material facts, as discussed infra in Part III.C.2.  Although it is 
possible that the trial court could have summarily dismissed the case against the 
Council, it seems unlikely if the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to it, as 
required by the applicable standard.  See id. 
 179 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437. 
 180 Id. at 438-42. 
 181 See N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 666 N.E.2d 185, 
190 (N.Y. 1996).  
 182 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1994).  For commentary on who 
qualifies as a “responsible bidder,” see 27 N.Y. JUR. 2D Counties, Towns & Municipal 
Corps. § 1357 (2001). 
 183 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 30-38. 
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safety of persons employed by any contractor or subcontractor 
performing work, labor or services for it.”184  The Council 
believed the EBL, by merely “set[ting] certain terms and 
conditions upon which New York City will choose to do 
business with private contractors,” fit comfortably within this 
granted power and thus was consistent with the text of the 
competitive bidding statute’s exception.185   
In addition, based on data from other major cities with 
similar laws, the Council asserted that the economic costs of 
enacting the EBL would be de minimis, and the law would 
ultimately yield financial benefits to the City.186  Thus, despite 
a possible small increase in costs for City-contracted services 
due to a reduction in the number of eligible bidders, the 
Council anticipated financial gains overall.187  Therefore, the 
Council argued, the EBL did not counteract the fiscal purpose 
of the competitive-bidding statute.188 
Finally, the Council sought refuge in a similar 
established exception to the lowest-responsible bidder 
requirement:  actions for the purpose of bringing economic 
benefits to the contracting authority.189  While the Council 
  
 184 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(10) (McKinney 1994); see N.Y. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(9); see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 30 (granting the Council 
powers to review city contracting policies and practices, including “fair employment 
practices of city contractors”). 
 185 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 31-32 (citing McMillen v. Browne, 200 
N.E.2d 546 (N.Y. 1964)).  In McMillen, the Court used similar language in upholding 
the imposition of a local minimum wage law for city contractors.  McMillen, 200 N.E.2d 
at 548. 
 186 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 38-42.  The City argued that providing 
equal benefits would enable employers to recruit the best and brightest employees; 
also, the State Comptroller testified to the Council that a reduction in public 
healthcare costs could result, as more employers would be likely to extend health 
insurance coverage to domestic partners.  Id. at 39-40. 
 187 Id. at 31-42. 
 188 Id.  As for the anti-corruption rationale for the competitive bidding law, the 
intent was to prevent fraud in the contracting process in the form of quid pro quo 
favoritism and other “sweetheart deals” by governmental procurement officials.  Frank 
Anechiarico & James B. Jacobs, Purging Corruption from Public Contracting: The 
“Solutions” Are Now Part of the Problem, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 143, 145-46 (1995).  
Indeed, the target of this facet of the law in New York City would be the Mayor’s office, 
which has the authority to choose among contractors to the extent that discretion is 
allowed.  See generally id.  The Mayor did not contend that the EBL was preempted on 
these grounds, Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 22-23, Council of N.Y. v. 
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 115214/04), 2005 WL 3818163 [hereinafter 
Council’s Reply Brief], yet the Majority implausibly suggested such general provisions 
as the EBL risked favoritism on the part of the Council in the awarding of contracts, 
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 438 (“[T]he municipality could design its requirements to 
match the benefit structure of the bidder it favored.”). 
 189 See N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 666 N.E.2d 185, 
190 (N.Y. 1996) (determinative question was whether the public authority’s labor 
 
2007] UPSETTING THE BALANCE 1285 
 
readily admitted that a primary motivation to pass the EBL 
was to pursue social change, it always maintained that 
“procuring cheaper, higher quality goods and services for the 
City” was another basic objective.190  Since the EBL arguably 
promoted such benefits that advance the same interests as 
embodied by the competitive bidding statute, the laws were not 
in conflict.191  The Court of Appeals flatly rejected the Council’s 
assertions in this regard without providing a basis for doing 
so.192   
b. ERISA 
The Court’s finding that the EBL was preempted by 
ERISA was based on the following broad provision of the 
federal act: “‘[ERISA] shall supersede any and all state laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan [described herein].”193  The Council argued, first, 
that the nature of the EBL excluded it from ERISA preemption 
as construed by both New York and federal courts, and, second, 
that the Council’s enactment fell within the “market 
participant” exception.194   
In Chesterfield Associates v. New York State Department 
of Labor, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the state 
agency’s compensation calculation method in its enforcement of 
New York State’s prevailing wage law (which compels 
contractors engaged in public works to pay their employees a 
prevailing wage).195  The Court cited Burgio and Campofelice, 
Inc. v. New York State Department of Labor, a Second Circuit 
case that held “ERISA does not preempt the . . . [prevailing 
wage] law because it does not mandate a particular set of 
benefits.”196  The Burgio opinion quoted the U.S. Supreme 
  
agreement “had as its purpose and likely effect the advancement of the interests 
embodied in the competitive bidding statutes”). 
 190 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 7. 
 191  Id. at 29-31. 
 192 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 439 (“[T]he Council cannot and does not 
seriously assert that the ‘purpose and likely effect’ of the law is to make the City’s 
contracts cheaper or their performance more efficient.”).  Evidently the Council’s 
arguments that the EBL would both yield better performance and ultimately protect 
the public fisc fell on deaf ears.  See Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 41-42. 
 193 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).  
 194 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 44-46. 
 195 Chesterfield Assocs. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 830 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 
2005). 
 196 Id. at 290 n.4 (citing Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1007 (2d Cir. 1997)).  
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Court:  “Preemption does not occur, however, if the state law 
has only a ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral’ connection with 
covered plans . . . .”197  The EBL did not require particular 
benefits or any type of plan; it did not even mandate that all 
employers provide the equal benefits it championed, merely 
that contractors who opted to bid for city contracts over 
$100,000 do so.198  The Council contended, therefore, that the 
law was not preempted by ERISA because it did not regulate 
any particular benefit and had only a peripheral effect on 
covered plans.199  The Majority ignored this line of reasoning 
entirely and only directly addressed the Council’s market 
participant exception argument.200 
A market participant exception to ERISA may exist 
when a state or its subdivision acts as a participant in the 
marketplace.201  The exception applies when such an entity acts 
to advance its proprietary interests, but not when it acts as a 
regulator.202  The Council’s argument here echoed that of its 
position on the competitive bidding statute in that economic 
interests did in part underlie the motivation to pass the EBL.203  
The Court in Bloomberg, however, narrowly construed the 
market participant exception, restricting its application to 
instances where the state acts exclusively for the purpose of 
protecting a proprietary interest, with “no interest in setting 
policy.”204  The Majority’s view is that even if the Council had a 
  
 197  Burgio, 107 F.3d at 1008 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
100 n.21 (1983)).  The Burgio court further stated that areas of traditional state 
regulation are not preempted unless there is an indication of congressional intent.  Id. 
(citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995)). 
 198 New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 27 (2004). 
 199 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 44-45. 
 200  See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 441. 
 201 See, e.g., Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & 
Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1993) (commonly referred to as 
Boston Harbor). 
 202 Id.  
 203  Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 46-52. 
 204 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 442 (quoting Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229) 
(emphasis added).  Despite the borrowed phrase from Boston Harbor, the Court’s 
absolutist position is not supported by the Supreme Court’s opinion.  The quote was 
taken from a section comparing a state’s market influence with that of a private entity; 
it reads in full, “These distinctions are far less significant when the State acts as a 
market participant with no interest in setting policy.”  Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229.  
Nowhere did the Supreme Court hold that the state’s purpose must be utterly devoid of 
a regulatory purpose when it operates in conjunction with an economic one.  As the 
Council noted, the Ninth Circuit upheld the San Francisco law analogous to the EBA 
under the market participant exception.  Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 49-50 
 
2007] UPSETTING THE BALANCE 1287 
 
legitimate economic basis for enacting the provision, the 
ERISA preemption exception would be unavailable because the 
EBL also had a social policy purpose.205  This interpretation of 
the market participant exception is needlessly restrictive when 
it precludes any law that contains a non-fiscal component.  It is 
also unclear how a court should evaluate the “purity” of a 
legislature’s motivation given the often unwieldy deliberative 
process. 
The persuasiveness of most of the Council’s arguments 
against preemption turns on findings of fact, including the 
purposes and likely effects of the EBL.  As such, the Court’s 
willingness to uphold the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the 
petition without providing an opportunity for a full evidentiary 
hearing may be seen as an egregious encroachment on the 
rights of the City Council.206 
IV. REPERCUSSIONS OF BLOOMBERG 
Disputes between executive and legislative bodies in 
New York governments are inevitable as political actors pursue 
their own agendas, but the Bloomberg ruling has changed the 
ground rules for these conflicts.  Although the ultimate 
outcome of Bloomberg may or may not have been just (a full 
hearing could well have ended with the same result), the case 
is likely to be remembered for the presumptuous judicial 
response to the dispute and the potential adverse effects of the 
Court’s ruling.  The Court’s decision disturbs the balance of 
power between the legislatures and executives under its 
jurisdiction.207  Given its extraordinary power of judicial review, 
the judiciary plays a special role in maintaining the power 
  
(citing Air Transp. Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998)). 
 205 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 441-42. 
 206 This is not to say that the Court necessarily ought to have granted the 
Council’s requested relief.  While it is plausible that the uncertainty over either case 
for preemption would be sufficient to defeat the “clear right” standard applicable to a 
mandamus proceeding, it is far less certain that the presumptive validity accorded 
legislative acts would be overcome.  Neither the Appellate Division’s two paragraphs 
nor the somewhat lengthier consideration by the Court of Appeals seemed to apply the 
stringent standard of review that would apply in a declaratory judgment action, see 
supra Part III.C.1, or even one appropriate for dismissing an Article 78 petition, in 
which all factual inferences should be taken in the petitioner’s favor.  See Council’s 
Reply Brief, supra note 188, at 15 (citing 511 W. 32nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty 
Co., 773 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 2002)). 
 207 See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 444 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
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balance among governmental branches.208  Bloomberg provides 
an example of how an ill-considered decision can effect a shift 
in the governmental balance of power.  It is an especially 
troubling case because the alteration of established judicial 
procedure was both unnecessary and unjust.  
A. The Separation of Powers Issues 
The Bloomberg decision signals a significant shift of 
power from legislatures to executives in New York State.  This 
transgression of separation of powers was precipitated by the 
failure of the customary checks and balances to manage an 
interbranch conflict, and ratified by a high court decision that 
burdens one branch to the benefit of another.  In effect, the 
Court legitimated the Mayor’s unilateral (in)action in direct 
opposition both to the Council’s overriding veto as well as to 
the Supreme Court’s denial of the temporary restraining 
order.209  Although the Court’s later holding vindicated the 
Mayor’s view that the EBL was invalid, the Mayor’s refusal to 
enforce a duly enacted law disrupted the law-making 
machinery instituted by the City Charter.210  By deciding that 
the EBL was preempted without the benefit of an evidentiary 
hearing, the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals strayed 
from customary procedures for determining the validity of a 
challenged enactment.211  In light of the foreseeable detrimental 
effects of taking this extraordinary judicial action, the Courts 
failed to observe a proper respect for the separation of powers 
doctrine.212  The assertion of unwarranted authority by the 
executive and the abnegation of the responsibility of both the 
executive and the judiciary to act with deference to coordinate 
branches threaten to undermine the capacity of legislative 
bodies in the state to represent their constituents.   
  
 208 See Cohen v. State of New York, 720 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y. 1999) (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (“The courts are vested with a 
unique role and review power over the constitutionality of legislation.”). 
 209 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437 (“Where a local law seems to the Mayor to 
conflict with a state or federal one, the Mayor’s obligation is to obey the latter . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 210 See id. at 443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
 211 See supra Part III.C.1. 
 212 Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 122, at 10. 
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1. How New York’s Legislative Bodies Have Been 
Weakened by Bloomberg 
Bloomberg is a case in which the usual mechanisms that 
govern the boundaries of interbranch action failed.  First, the 
Council’s power to override a mayoral veto was nullified when 
the Charter’s provision for automatic enactment was annulled 
by the Mayor’s refusal to enforce the law.  Mayor Bloomberg 
objected to the EBL on both policy and legal grounds.213  Those 
two different bases invoke separate courses of action within the 
Mayor’s granted authority, the veto214 and a legal challenge.215  
The executive branch has no special authority to ignore a law 
that furthers a policy with which the executive disagrees; 
rather, he or she has a sworn duty to uphold and execute the 
law.216  In this case, after the Council overrode the veto and the 
court denied him an injunction, the Mayor went beyond any 
right or remedy available to his office by refusing to implement 
the EBL, enacted by the veto override.217  He defied the system 
of checks and balances by acting on his unilateral judgment of 
the EBL’s legal status.218  
By sanctioning this executive branch overreach, 
Bloomberg subverted the existing power balance between the 
Mayor’s office and the Council.219  Allowing New York courts to 
address the validity of a law as a defense in an Article 78 
proceeding grants de facto executive officeholders an extra-
constitutional alternative to thwart legislative will.220  By 
  
 213 Tavernise, supra note 127. 
 214 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 37. 
 215 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 442 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (“An executive is 
authorized to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging an enactment’s 
constitutionality . . . .”). 
 216 Id. at 443. 
 217 Id. at 447. 
 218 A contrary view of the propriety of executive action upon an independent 
determination of a law’s validity is contemplated in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993).  Paulsen argues that a conception of separation of powers 
that subordinates executive authority to judicial review is inconsistent with the 
granting of executive powers that may be exercised without regard for legal precedent 
or justification, such as the ability to pardon or veto legislation for any reason 
whatsoever.  Id. at 81-83.  However, this Note takes the position that this tension 
dissolves when these “extraordinary” powers are understood to be the very mechanisms 
of the doctrine that define each branch’s authority in a balanced system of carefully 
allocated power.  See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 219 Winnie Hu, Mayor Need Not Enforce Certain Laws, Court Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at B3 (citing legal experts). 
 220 Council’s Brief, supra note 142, at 16-17. 
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simply refusing to administer an enactment and mounting a 
legal defense to actions initiated by the legislative branch, an 
executive can at least delay and possibly evade implementing a 
policy.  Imagine the Court in Bloomberg decided the case in the 
Council’s favor.  Then, the Mayor’s inaction would have 
“illegally” affected city contracting transactions for over a year.  
As a practical matter, the beneficial inducement effect of the 
law over that time period would never be realized, and the 
indirect financial gains anticipated from the measure further 
delayed.  Not only might significant costs result, but more 
fundamentally it would represent a failure of the democratic 
process to carry out the people’s bidding.221 
By encouraging this very course of action, Bloomberg 
augments the power of executives in the state at the expense of 
legislative bodies.  “As things turned out, the Court of Appeals 
gave executive officials of the local and state governments of 
New York a significant procedural advantage for the resolution 
of disputes with legislative bodies over allegedly invalid 
legislation.”222  Executives may now sit back and do nothing 
while preparing to meet legal action initiated by the legislative 
body, thereby placing an added burden on the legislative 
branch simply to have its enactments put into effect.223  The 
executive would thereby force the legislature to expend 
additional resources merely to exercise its granted powers.224  
Such executive recalcitrance saps the full effectiveness of the 
legislative body.  In some cases, it can be expected that 
legislators will be deterred altogether from undertaking a legal 
battle over a contested enactment due to the expense.  Thus, 
the will of the legislative body, and its constituents, may at 
times be utterly thwarted.   
While it is true that an executive may pay a political 
price for opposing popular measures in this manner, the 
effectiveness of this check varies with the timing of the election 
cycle and the relative importance of the pertinent issue in the 
  
 221 Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 122, at 6. 
 222 Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 
7B, CPLR C7801:5, at 4-5 (Supp. 2007). 
 223 See Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (“[I]t should 
not be necessary for [the Council] to start a lawsuit saying, in effect, ‘We’ve passed the 
law and really meant it . . . .’”). 
 224 Moreover, there appears to be little cost for executives who adopt this 
approach.  If they eventually are unsuccessful in the courts, the likely effect would be 
no more than an order to enforce the law from that point forward.  While they may pay 
a price at the polls (assuming their position is an unpopular one, since a supermajority 
of legislators opposed it), the result is still, at best, justice delayed. 
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voters’ decision-making process.  Others might defend an 
executive’s ability to act on his or her own legal determination 
as a desirable means by which to counteract an improvident 
exercise of legislative power.  Regardless of the wisdom of this 
approach, such executive encroachment into legislative power 
is inconsistent with the separation of powers embodied in the 
state constitution.  Governors in New York have the express 
obligation to enforce the laws that have been put into effect by 
a veto override.225  The same, of course, goes for New York City 
mayors under its charter.226  
2. The Nature of the Harm Threatened  
The harmful effects of Bloomberg arise from the 
increased risk that legitimate enactments of law may be 
delayed or indeed never see the light of day.  When a legitimate 
law-making process is hampered, the public loses the full force 
of its most representative voice, and when such laws are 
erroneously stuck down, this voice is not only weakened, but 
completely silenced. 
This danger may be enhanced by judicial error or bias.  
When courts address the validity of a law in limited 
proceedings, the result may well be that some enactments will 
be struck down that might not have been had their proponents 
received a full hearing.  It is at least arguable that this was the 
result in Bloomberg.227  The same result could also occur if a 
judiciary that is sympathetic to the executive’s position 
improperly intrudes upon the political sphere under the pretext 
of assessing a law’s validity in order to stifle legislative action 
and the people’s will.  
Another detrimental effect of this failure to respect the 
separation of powers is a heightening of interbranch tensions.  
As discussed above, the Bloomberg precedent increases the 
likelihood for similar acts of executive encroachment in the 
future.  Beyond the practical burdens placed on legislative 
bodies to have their laws enforced, increased frustration and 
animosity between branches are predictable results.  
Adversarial relations between the legislative and executive 
bodies are damaging to good governance, as the branches must 
  
 225 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
 226 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 37. 
 227 See supra Part III.C.2. 
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work together to work at all.228  Recognition of this potential for 
unhealthy conflict warrants the exercise of greater deference. 
B. Bloomberg’s Heedless and Dangerous Precedent 
What is remarkable about Bloomberg is that there was 
no need to levy this insult upon the separation of powers 
doctrine.  Because mandamus relief should be granted only 
when the petitioner is due a clear legal right, there is no reason 
why the instant courts could not have dismissed the Council’s 
petition and let the declaratory judgment action deal with the 
issue of the EBL’s validity separately.  As one state court has 
cautioned, “[the] Petitioner’s right to obtain an order of 
mandamus rests in the sound discretion of the court . . . and 
the court’s power should be exercised cautiously when to do so 
will interfere with the functions of co-equal branches of 
government.”229  The Court’s abuse of Article 78 procedure in 
this case was unnecessary, unfair, and, notwithstanding the 
disposition of this case, may well exacerbate inefficiencies in 
similar adjudication. 
1. The Judiciary’s Unnecessary Procedural Shortcut 
The Court’s decision in Bloomberg was unwarranted 
because an unequivocally appropriate recourse existed to 
resolve the dispute—to restore the Mayor’s original declaratory 
judgment action.230  The Court need not have decided the law’s 
validity in order to dismiss the mandamus petition; instead, it 
could have based the dismissal on the failure of the Council to 
establish that it had a “clear legal right” to relief.231  Thereafter, 
the declaratory judgment action on the preemption issue could 
resume.  The only justification given for the course taken, by 
both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, was the 
interest of efficiency, to dispense with the case without further 
  
 228 See Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 22-23.  The authors comment that 
a benefit of incorporating multiple government actors in the decision-making process is 
the encouragement of consensus-building; the downside, of course, is that fractious 
relations can interfere with the operation of government.  See id. at 14-15 (discussing 
some scholars’ critique of divided government leading to “needless institutional conflict, 
division, and gridlock”). 
 229 Williams v. Bryant, 395 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1977). 
 230 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 444 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
 231 See supra note 138. 
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proceedings.232  This argument turns the concept of Article 78 
expediency on its head, however.  Streamlining of the writ 
practice was not intended to relieve court dockets, but rather to 
benefit claimants pursuing their rights in the face of 
governmental abuse or inaction.233  Placing writ practice within 
the purview of special proceedings was a recognition that, for 
many cases, a ruling on the papers was all that was needed, 
not that it was all that was due.234  Thus, courts are instructed 
to convert Article 78 and other special proceedings into full 
actions whenever appropriate, and hearings on issues of 
material fact are to be held whenever they arise.235  Reinstating 
the Mayor’s action for declaratory judgment would have been 
consistent with this policy. 
Nor can it persuasively be argued that there is a danger 
in maintaining the status quo rule.  The Majority in Bloomberg 
asserted that validity must be examined in a mandamus case 
lest a truly detestable (and clearly unconstitutional) act be 
perpetrated upon the people.236  They proffered an example of a 
legislature that passes a law requiring racial segregation in 
public schools, and argued that it would be absurd to preclude 
a court from striking such a law, even in an Article 78 
setting.237  Even if one considers such an extreme case (which 
could only arise if a legislative supermajority rammed through 
such an odious, obviously unconstitutional, or patently 
dangerous measure), one would expect that an executive need 
only move for a temporary restraining order, as Mayor 
Bloomberg did for the EBL.238  The difference is that in the 
hypothetical scenario, the court would be certain to grant the 
motion, and any potential harm would be averted.239 
  
 232 Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 791 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (App. Div. 2005); 
Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
 233 SIEGEL, supra note 167, at 904 (“A special proceeding is a quick and 
inexpensive way to implement a right.”).  See also Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25 
(App. Div. 1961). 
 234 SIEGEL, supra note 167, at 904-05. 
 235 Id. at 905. 
 236 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 436-37. 
 237 Id. at 437. 
 238 Id. at 443 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting). 
 239 If this nefarious conspiracy had infected the judicial branch as well, then—
and only then—would the author agree that unitary action by the executive is 
warranted.  The distinction lies in the degree of harm threatened and the true 
incompatibility of the offensive enactment with existing bodies of law (rather than a 
mere debatable inconsistency).  The hypothetical is far from the scenario in Bloomberg, 
however, or any other likely to arise. 
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2. The Injustice of the Court’s Ruling 
The procedural shortcut taken by the Bloomberg Court 
inflicted an unfair disadvantage on the City Council for the act 
of vigilantly pursuing its rights.  If the Council had not filed 
the Article 78 petition in response to the Mayor’s refusal to 
enforce the law, it would likely have had a full evidentiary 
hearing on the validity of the EBL in the previously filed 
declaratory judgment action.240  Instead, as a petitioner seeking 
mandamus to compel, it was inappropriately put in the position 
of defending the law’s validity in a limited proceeding.241  The 
Court effectively punished the party seeking that the rule of 
law be observed.242  This decision will undoubtedly deter a 
legislative body from employing the mandamus writ (which in 
some circumstances would be the appropriate vehicle) to 
achieve this purpose.  Instead, if the executive simply refuses 
to act at all (as is now undeniably the best strategy), the 
legislative body will have to seek a declaratory judgment if it 
wants to ensure it receives a full hearing.  This is problematic 
for the reasons discussed above:  the remedy will necessarily be 
improperly delayed,243 and the attendant costs could deter the 
action altogether. 
3. The Courts’ Flawed Efficiency Rationale 
The expediency of dispensing with customary procedure 
in Bloomberg could end up being counterproductive.  The 
Majority rejected as a “purposeless exercise” the Dissent’s 
argument that the declaratory judgment action be resumed to 
consider the validity of the EBL.244  They noted that Article 78 
proceedings are designed for prompt resolution, and concluded 
that the issue of the EBL’s validity could be decided as a 
matter of law.245  This concern for judicial efficiency may be not 
  
 240 See supra Part III.C.1. 
 241 Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 122, at 9-10. 
 242 See id. at 10 (arguing that the Mayor should not be permitted to raise the 
validity of the EBL even as a defense because he effectively forced the Council to bring 
the Article 78 proceeding through his inaction). 
 243 The legislative body could seek a preliminary injunction ordering the 
executive to comply with the law, but, as demonstrated in Bloomberg, there is no way 
to enforce such an order if the executive simply refuses to acknowledge the decision.  
(An Article 78 petition in the nature of a mandamus to compel compliance with the 
injunction springs to mind, but we can imagine what the defense would be.) 
 244 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
 245 Id. at 437. 
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only misapplied,246 but also misconceived, because the holding 
may lead to less efficient adjudication of similar disputes. 
A predictable outcome from this decision is 
multiplicative adjudication.  The Court granted discretionary 
authority to courts hearing Article 78 proceedings to go beyond 
the scope comprehended by the CPLR.247  Instead of deciding 
merely whether the petitioner has a clear legal right to an 
action by a body or officer under the law, courts may now opt to 
pass judgment on the validity of the underlying law in such a 
proceeding when it is raised as a defense.248  To do so, they 
must first decide whether or not evidentiary hearings or 
conversion to a declaratory judgment action is appropriate.  
Presumably, in some cases, courts will decline to exercise 
either of these options, and this decision would be reviewable 
on appeal for abuse of discretion.  If the determination is found 
to be erroneous, the likely result is remand with an order to 
take the necessary action.  This needless delay in adjudication 
and potentially unnecessary involvement of the Appellate 
Division is an inefficient use of judicial resources.  
The adjudication of a law’s validity entails standards 
and procedures established by statutes and the common law.249  
Parties should not be able to circumvent this authority merely 
as a result of their defensive posture in an Article 78 
proceeding.  Bypassing the established process in a case such 
as Bloomberg is not supported by arguments for efficiency, 
fairness, or necessity.  The Court has thus needlessly imposed 
an added burden on New York legislatures, which has the 
direct consequence of impeding their ability to vigorously 
represent the will of their constituents. 
  
 246 As discussed previously, the efficiency of special proceedings was primarily 
intended to benefit claimants, not the courts.  See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 247 The CPLR identifies the only four questions that may be determined in an 
Article 78 proceeding, which relate to the purposes of the common law writs and do not 
include statutory review.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994). 
 248 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 437. 
 249 See supra Part III.C.1. 
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V. PROSPECTS FOR MITIGATING BLOOMBERG’S 
DELETERIOUS EFFECTS 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Bloomberg cannot be 
appealed and is not likely to be revisited any time soon.250  
Therefore, executives in New York have the Court’s 
imprimatur to act upon their unilateral decisions concerning 
the validity of laws, and trial courts have been given an 
invitation to bypass previously established procedures to 
adjudicate those disputes.  As an immediate response, this 
Note urges these actors to exercise deference to legislatures by 
foregoing those paths.  A more forceful solution to the problem 
would be for the state legislature to amend the CPLR to 
preclude adjudication of a law’s validity without providing an 
opportunity for a full and fair hearing (subject to the usual 
threshold standard of summary judgment). 
A. Deference of Coordinate Branches 
The separation of powers doctrine is not an end to itself, 
but the means to ensure the best, most representative 
government possible.251  Government actors can only properly 
advance this goal by refraining from encroachment upon 
coordinate branches.252  These restraints on power do not 
render governmental branches powerless to influence 
coordinate branches; they may pursue both political and legal 
avenues of advocacy and redress.  But actions that breach the 
accepted limits on power, as put forth in foundational 
documents, are offensive to democratic rule and should not be 
embarked upon. 
In the case of the EBL, Mayor Bloomberg is not to be 
faulted for asserting his good faith position that the law was 
preempted by the state and federal statutes.  An executive 
ought to pursue his or her interests vigorously, but every 
government officer is irrevocably obligated to uphold the rule of 
law.  Mayor Bloomberg overstepped the power imbued in the 
executive office by ignoring the law after the veto override and 
  
 250 There are no issues of federal law implicated that would permit an appeal 
in federal court.  See MARK DAVIES, MARIANNE STECICH & RISA I. GOLD, NEW YORK 
CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 2.2 (West 1996). 
 251 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 252  See, e.g., 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 250 (1998) (addressing 
both federal and state contexts). 
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the denial of the temporary injunction.253  At that point, the 
legislative and judicial branches had spoken, and the Charter’s 
mandate allowed the Mayor no discretion to act to the contrary, 
at least until the courts had an opportunity to address the 
matter in litigation.254  However, there is no mechanism in the 
current system that can force this compliance—nothing more, 
that is, than the deference owed to a popularly elected, 
coordinate branch of government.255  As Justice Burger wrote, 
the “hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate 
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to 
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.”256 
Similarly, in cases and controversies implicating the 
separation of powers, the judiciary ought to adopt the 
deferential posture of a coequal branch of government.257  Going 
forward, New York courts may yet adhere to this constraint by 
refusing to follow the course set in Bloomberg.  Although they 
are required to consider the validity of a statute when the issue 
is raised as a defense in an Article 78 proceeding, they have the 
authority under the CPLR to take whatever measures may be 
necessary to assure that triable issues of fact receive a full 
hearing.258  This power includes converting the proceeding to an 
action for declaratory judgment.259  By doing so, the court would 
simply utilize the statutory means to settle these disputes.  
This includes application of the standards and presumptions 
normally afforded legislative enactments.  Legislatures and 
  
 253 Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 447 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (“Just as a 
judicial ‘injunction must be obeyed until modified or dissolved, and its 
unconstitutionality is no defense to disobedience’ . . . , duly enacted legislation must be 
enforced by the executive branch and its alleged invalidity is no defense.” (quoting 
Metro. Opera Assoc., Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union, 
239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2001))). 
 254 Id. 
 255 See Southwick, supra note 45, at 935 (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘absence of structural mechanisms to 
require those officials to [restrain from encroachment], and the momentary political 
convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so,’ leads to temptation . . . .”)).  In 
Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that this lack of safeguards may justify judicial 
intervention when one of the political branches failed to maintain the constitutional 
balance.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 256 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 257 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 40.  However, other problems arise 
when judicial deference is exercised in favor of one branch over another.  See Neal 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from 
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2321 (2006). 
 258 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7804(h) (McKinney 1994). 
 259 See id. § 103(c); Kovarsky v. Hous. and Dev. Admin. of the City of N.Y., 286 
N.E.2d 882, 885-86 (N.Y. 1972). 
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their constituents are owed nothing less, regardless of the 
procedural context in which the challenge arises. 
Because of its unique role as final arbiter of what the 
law is, the judiciary occupies a singular place within our 
system of divided government.260  This special role is 
highlighted in the face of executive-legislative branch conflicts.  
To this extent, judicial review somewhat belies the theory that 
no branch is superior to the others.261  While this power has 
been controversial since the time of Marbury v. Madison, it is 
beyond question that there is an expectation that the judiciary 
bears an enhanced responsibility to maintain and uphold 
separation of powers principles.262   
However, in their ambitious re-articulation of 
separation of powers theory, Peabody and Nugent expressed 
great wariness of the judiciary’s role in resolving such 
disputes.263  Nevertheless, they recognize its appropriateness in 
some circumstances, and advocate a deliberate approach.264  
They recommend, first, that courts resist early intervention, in 
order to allow the parties to negotiate a resolution or at least 
“to construct an adequate record for judges to assess.”265  
Second, where the political system has run its course and 
courts find themselves adjudicating these conflicts, the 
judiciary “should attempt self-consciously to address how its 
ruling will affect the various levels at which the separation of 
powers operate.”266  The Majority in Bloomberg failed to act 
with anything remotely resembling this degree of care.  At a 
  
 260 See, e.g., Cohen v. State of N.Y., 720 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y. 1999) (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 261 See generally Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing 
Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729 (2005).  In the federal context, see United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04 (1974) (“[T]he Court has authority to interpret claims with 
respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.”). 
 262 MANSFIELD, supra note 11, at 14; 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law 
§ 250 (1998); see also Cohen, 720 N.E.2d at 854-55; WILSON, supra note 7, at 82-83. 
 263 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 36-38.  This prudence is premised in 
part on their belief that among the salutary effects of distributed powers are the 
opportunities afforded for negotiations and compromise between branches.  Id. at 39-
40.  It also rests upon the conclusion that courts often lack the requisite competence to 
ascertain the true nature of core functions of the coordinate branches.  Id. at 39.   
  Others have advocated the use of litigation for legislative-executive 
clashes, where appropriate.  E.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 15-16 (noting the utility 
of an authoritative third-party mediator to avoid acrimonious conflicts); Garry, supra 
note 4, at 689 (arguing for a more active judicial role in enforcing constitutionally 
mandated separation of powers). 
 264 Peabody & Nugent, supra note 6, at 40-42. 
 265 Id. at 40. 
 266 Id. 
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minimum, appropriate deference would include the adherence 
to established procedures of adjudication and standards of 
review that were abandoned in this case.  
B. Legislative Action 
The state legislature could easily address the concerns 
raised in this Note by amending the New York Civil Practice 
Law and Rules.  By revising the procedures for adjudicating 
the validity of legislative acts, they could ensure that those 
defending the validity of enactments receive a full and fair 
hearing.  A codification of the existing common law rule that a 
petitioner may not challenge the validity of a law in an Article 
78 proceeding267 could be modestly augmented by a rule that 
requires courts to convert such a proceeding to an action for 
declaratory judgment, upon a motion by the petitioner, when 
the validity of the underlying law is raised as a defense.  This 
legislative fix would merely provide that in this particular 
situation conversion would be a matter of right for the 
petitioner.   
Legislating a procedural rule change to remedy a 
perceived injustice perpetuated by the judiciary is not a novel 
approach.  One precedent for such a legislative “overruling” can 
be found in Congress’ 1992 Civil Rights Act.268  In Ward’s Cove 
Packing Company v. Atonio, the Supreme Court altered its 
allocation of the burden of proof in disparate-impact 
discrimination claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.269  Previous to the ruling, a defendant employer had the 
onus of proving that an employment practice was based solely 
on a legitimate neutral consideration, but in Ward’s Cove the 
Supreme Court placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that 
the employer’s proffered justification was invalid.270  Congress 
reacted by using its legislative powers to set forth by statute 
the requirements necessary for making a case of employment 
discrimination in the absence of proof of intent.271  The New 
York State legislature could take a similar step to ensure that 
  
 267 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 268 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 161-63.  
 269 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-
53 (2003). 
 270 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 162; see Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60. 
 271 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 12; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 
105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000)). 
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judicial procedure ensures fairness in the adjudication of 
legislative validity.  The fact that legislative bodies are the 
ones aggrieved by this decision ought to provide sufficient 
motivation for such a response. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The constitutions (and charters) organizing government 
structure reflect careful choices of power allocation.  Especially 
in the states, these foundational documents have been the 
focus of various amendments as the people have sought to 
improve the protections and the efficiencies of the political 
systems under which they live.272  Government officers swear to 
uphold these embodiments of the peoples’ will, and are thus 
obliged to heed their guiding principles.  Both the executive 
and judicial branches in the Bloomberg conflict failed to respect 
the separation of powers doctrine.  The Mayor’s refusal to 
enforce the Equal Benefits Law in the face of both the Council’s 
overriding veto as well as a court judgment was an act in 
excess of his authority.273  But the Court’s conduct was even 
more damaging.274  When interbranch conflicts require judicial 
intervention, courts must tread carefully because they are 
entrusted with the ultimate authority to say what the law is 
and what the constitution demands.275   
The Bloomberg decision highlights important issues to 
be considered when the machinery underlying the separation of 
powers breaks down.  The system of checks and balances 
governs the interplay among the departments and proscribes 
limits for each branch’s proper exercise of power.  The 
effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the good faith 
efforts of political actors to observe and respect the limitations 
imposed by separated government.276  Each department owes 
due deference toward coordinate branches to the extent 
reflected by these organizing principles, thereby ensuring 
enactment of the democratic will tempered by procedural and 
structural safeguards.   
Unfortunately, both the executive and, especially, the 
judicial branches involved in the EBL dispute failed to 
  
 272 See supra Part II.C. 
 273 See supra Part IV.A. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See supra Part IV.B. 
 276 See supra Part II.A. 
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recognize, or failed to heed, their implied obligations under the 
doctrine of separation of powers.  Although the EBL may not 
have fared any better as a result of these breaches of due 
deference, the Court of Appeals has ratified Mayor Bloomberg’s 
extra-legal disobedience to the benefit of New York State’s 
executive officeholders.  The Court’s ruling ignored long-
standing precedent that ensured the presumption of validity 
accorded to legislative bodies by allowing the issue to be 
conclusively determined in a limited special proceeding.277  In 
doing so, it effected a significant shift in the balance of power 
established by the state’s constitution.278  What is worse is that 
this affront to democratic principles was entirely gratuitous.279 
In Bloomberg, the Court not only failed to exhibit 
adequate deference to coordinate branches by adhering to 
established adjudicative procedures, but compounded the harm 
by inviting the state’s courts to follow suit.  These courts should 
decline this invitation unless precautions are taken to assure a 
full and fair hearing.  Should the current state of affairs impair 
the ability of law-making bodies in the state to perform their 
duties, the New York State Legislature should amend the civil 
practice rules to ensure that limited proceedings are not 
exploited to circumvent due consideration of the validity of 
their enactments. 
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